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Abstract: This paper identifies key sources of policy uncertainty which can adversely 
affect investment in the electric power industry, covering both generation and network 
assets. We focus on asymmetric, systematic, non-diversifiable risk with spin-offs. In 
generation, a key uncertainty is the inability of governments to refrain from intervention 
if capacity gets scarce and prices rise. The policy expectations can in fact be self-
fulfilling. One issue in network investment is that price-cap regulation is less suited to 
handling market risk than rate-of-return regulation. Another issue is the apparent inability 
of regulators to credibly commit to pre-announced policy. With increasing importance of 
new investment, a case can be made that (used-and-useful) rate-of-return regulation will 
regain territory in the future. Furthermore, improving checks and balances within the 
structure of regulation should be a focus of policy and good governance. 
JEL classification: L590, L940 
Keywords: electricity, generation, regulation, reliability, networks, policy uncertainty 
 
1 Introduction 
Supply adequacy in power markets takes on added importance in liberalized markets. 
Relevant episodes illustrating inadequacies in the electricity supply industry include the 
California power crises of 2001, which raised questions of whether liberalised power markets 
set adequate incentives to invest in new assets, and, the recent blackouts in both the US and 
Europe, which raised concerns about the adequacy of the high voltage transmission networks.  
The US-based North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) defines reliability as: 
“the degree of performance of the elements of the bulk electric system that results in 
electricity being delivered to customers within accepted standards and in the amount desired. 
Reliability may be measured by the frequency, duration, and magnitude of adverse effects on 
the electric supply (or service to customers).” Further, reliability is divided into two functional 
                                                
1 The authors are grateful to Christopher Bliss, Richard Green, Karsten Neuhoff, Hans-Joerg Weiss and an 
anonymous referee for useful comments and discussion. Gert Brunekreeft gratefully acknowledges research 
funding  from ESSENT nv.; however, the views expressed in this paper are the sole responsibility of the authors.  
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attributes: adequacy and security. We focus on adequacy which following the UCTE (2003, p. 
7): “measures the capability of the power system to supply the load in all the steady states in 
which the power system may exist considering standard conditions.” This reflects the long-
term concern whether there is sufficient investment. We use the term supply adequacy to 
cover both generation and network adequacy. 
The discussion on supply adequacy identifies many problem areas. In this paper we focus 
on policy uncertainty which we apply broadly as the effect on investment incentives as a 
consequence of uncertain government policy. A narrow definition would be the uncertain 
effect of economic regulation alone. We attempt to identify key sources of policy uncertainty, 
to analyse their effects on supply adequacy and to give recommendations for reducing its 
impact on investment. Concerning new investment in generation assets, the problem seems to 
be that governments cannot credibly commit to doing nothing if capacity becomes scarce and 
price soars. Tangential to this issue is the uncertainty created by potential intervention where 
there is currently no regulation. 
As a benchmark we assume that risks which are symmetric, non-systematic, diversifiable 
and without (future) spin-offs do not affect investment. The benchmark allows us to identify 
types of uncertainty which do have an effect, namely: 1) asymmetry, affecting expected 
returns, 2) incompletely-diversifiable risk which, through the CAPM, affects the risk premium 
as reflected in the cost of capital, and 3) uncertainty creating real option values. 
Arguably the most urgent issue at the moment is whether there will be adequate 
investment in peak generation capacity. Amidst a wide range of arguments, policy uncertainty 
emerges as a real problem. The argument is essentially that political reality dictates that if 
generation capacity becomes scarce and prices rise political pressure is likely to force 
intervention by the regulator or responsible government body. The primary effect of this type 
of uncertainty is asymmetry: while the upside of the price distribution is likely to be capped, 
the downside is not. Asymmetry has an effect on expected returns (in contrast to the cost of 
capital) since the distribution of possible prices is truncated. This line of argument leads to the 
widely discussed ‘hold-up’ problem in risky projects, which also finds application in network 
regulation, including (new) interconnectors. The typical problem is that a firm invests in sunk 
assets, after which a regulator, or more generally the state, principally has the possibility to 
take away (part of) the assets. If the regulator cannot credibly commit to refrain from 
opportunistically clawing back the sunk assets, firms will anticipate the possibility which will 
suppress new sunk investment. These effects received strong attention after landmark cases in 
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the US electricity industry, where the pass-through of costs associated with unused nuclear 
assets was (surprisingly) disallowed (cf. e.g. Joskow, 1989). 
In the context of the electric grid, the more narrowly defined regulatory uncertainty is the 
key problem since market risks (costs and demand) depend on the type of regulation or if 
there is regulation at all. Here, the overall effect will be on the cost of capital. Wright, et. al. 
(2003, p. 121) explain carefully that the CAPM approach allows or even makes it necessary to 
consider only systematic, non-diversifiable risk; i.e. risk that has a non-zero covariance with a 
market portfolio and which cannot be diversified with other assets. The admittedly extreme 
approach only considers systematic risk which implies that many types of policy uncertainty 
simply have negligible effects unless a relation with a market portfolio can be made plausible. 
The interesting systematic effects include the consequences of market risk on firms’ cost of 
capital under a price-cap, rate-of-return regulation or no regulation. 
Lastly, uncertainty around, for example, environmental or nuclear policy creates a real 
option value if it pays off to wait and see, in which case one would expect delays in 
investment. The real options model, as developed by Dixit & Pindyck (1994) essentially says 
that project valuations and thereby the investment decision should include the potential spin-
offs on future prospects and/or other projects. Brealey & Myers (2003) distinguish four 
different real options: the option to expand, the option to wait and learn, the option to shrink 
or abandon, and the option to vary the mix of production methods. Of these, the second is the 
most important for our purposes. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: sections 2 and 3 examine generation 
and network adequacy, respectively, and section 4 concludes. 
 
2 Generation adequacy 
2.1 Some evidence on generation investment 
In this section we will give some empirical indication of the development of generation 
capacity. The numbers suggest that there may be reason for concern about future adequacy. 
Moreover there appears to be a remarkable difference between development in the US, where 
reserve margins have dropped and Europe where reserve margins are stable. In most cases we 
will adopt the generation reserve margin as an indicator, which is defined as the difference 
between installed capacity and peak demand as a ratio of installed capacity. It should be noted 
though that numbers on generation adequacy presented by different institutions may be 
difficult to compare since indicators like reserve margin, capacity margin and reserve factors 
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are quite often defined in terms of variations. Moreover, installed capacity is not always fully 
adjusted for capacity that is not (or only partly) available, reserves and planned outages, 
mothballed and import capacity. 
Figure 1: USA reserve margin 1991 - 2002 
Source: EIA Electricity Power Annual, 2002 Table 3.2 
 
The OECD (2002, pp. 22/23) indicate past reserve margins for OECD countries 
between 1985 to 1999. The European reserve margin has been stable at approximately 33%. 
The Asia Pacific region started with a 35% margin, dropped to 25% but rose again to 35% 
since mid-1990. Notably, the US reserve margin dropped steadily from 30% to 16% in 1999, 
which is low. Figure 1 shows the reserve margin across the contiguous US between 1991 and 
2002.2 Reserve margins are at their lowest during the period after plans for deregulation were 
underway, but before definitive commitments were made (i.e, 1997-1999 or the time between 
FERC orders 888 and 2000). Some rebounding occurred around the time of  FERC’s Order 
2000. The picture which emerges here is consistent with a wait and see attitude of how the 
deregulation process would unfold. FERC orders 888 and 2000 deal primarily with open and 
transparent transmission access and rules for creating RTOs, but within the 1996-2000 period 
policies on competition at the wholesale and retail levels also began to take shape. To some 
extent the later increase in margins were due to merchant investments that were later 
untenable. Joskow (2003) describes this period as a boom-bust cycle in electricity that was not 
unlike the high tech bubble of the same time. As the bubble burst many proposed projects 
were abandoned.  
                                                
2 We label the graph with “capacity margin” as in the source although the figure depicts “reserve margins” 























The end of the stock market bubble, a better understanding by investors of the 
real economics and market risks associated with building merchant generating 
plants and trading commodity electricity, trading and accounting improprieties, 
credit downgrades, refinancing problems, and uncertainties about the future 
direction of industry restructuring, wholesale market rules, and retail 
competition, have decimated the merchant generating and trading sector 
slashing investment and trading activity and dramatically increasing the cost of 
capacity for new generating plants and very significantly reducing liquidity in 
forward electricity markets. (Joskow, 2003, p. 22/3). 
 
Forecasts for 2007 and beyond are typically pessimistic but this is at least partly due to a lack 
of information on new, unknown or un-declared additions. The phenomenon is illustrated by 
the apparent slowdown of capacity additions further in time in table 1, which gives planned 






% natural gas 
2003 71,392 70,063 98.1 
2004 40,531 39,445 97.3 
2005 37,116 35,077 94.5 
2006 37,429 32,150 85.9 
2007 13,166 9,346 71.0 
Table 1: USA Planned Nameplate Capacity Additions, 2003-2007 
Source: EIA, Electric Power Annual, 2002 Table 2.4 
 
Figure 2: UCTE forecast of remaining capacity. 
Source: UCTE (2003) 
 
A similar picture can be seen in the UCTE area if expressed in remaining capacity, as 
in figure 2. The UCTE covers a large part of Europe except the Nordic countries, Great 
Britain and Ireland. Remaining capacity is defined as guaranteed capacity less peak load. 
Guaranteed capacity is installed capacity minus non-usable capacity (including wind) and 













reserve of 5% of installed capacity, which is considered to be reasonable; this is depicted by 
the dotted line in figure 2. If remaining capacity falls below the 5% reserve margin, scarcity 
problems may occur. It should be stressed that this 5% is not short run reserves, as these have 
been accounted for in the remaining capacity. The 5% reserve margin is a security margin for 
more serious and persistent disturbances and larger than expected demand. The estimates of 
UCTE indicate that the margins improve slightly in the next two or three years but fall 
noticeably after 2007. Again, the post-2007 numbers should be taken with care as they are 
projections without full information on new and planned investments; at the same time, 
unknown decommissions are not included either. Remarkably, if the same data are used to 
make the rather rough calculation of the reserve margin for the UCTE region, we find that this 
falls slightly from 33% now to 31.5% in 2010. Hence, in these terms one would be rather 
optimistic, both in time and compared to the USA. 
Remaining capacity is typically lower in summer than in winter, which is odd as peak 
loads (or a proxy of this) are typically in winter-time (mainly February). This can be a 
combination of two factors. First the problems which have occurred in the UCTE area were 
predominantly in summer, as the high temperature forced power plants to shut down because 
cooling water was above allowed temperature. Second, maintenance is typically scheduled in 
summer (implying that guaranteed capacity is typically lower in summer); one would expect 
to see more maintenance shifted to milder months. 
 
Figure 3: Import dependence in the Netherlands 
Source: TenneT (2004) 
 
The Dutch TSO, TenneT, gives a detailed estimate of future capacity margins in the 
Netherlands (cf. TenneT, June 2004). The resulting reserve margins are given in figure 3. 

























capacity but excludes peaking capacity3 and capacity for UCTE obligations. Non-usable 
capacity is low at the moment, but predicted to be 3.3 GW (compared to 19GW peak demand) 
in 2010. TenneT makes an explicit and important analysis of import capacity, which is 
reflected in figure 3. Import capacity grows from currently 3.6 GW to a predicted 6.1 GW in 
2010 (which is 30% of peak load).4 This makes all the difference for the reserve margin in the 
Netherlands. With import capacity, the reserve margin is steady rate at more than 25%. 
Without import capacity the reserve margin drops to below 4%, which would be too low. 
Import capacity should be taken into account because it exists. However, there still is a notion 
that in case of emergencies TSOs may (have to) give priority to their home country and thus 
governments are getting slightly nervous with import dependency. Furthermore, import 
capacity is not the same as genuine generation capacity and not all countries can rely on 
imports at the same time. 
 
 
Figure 4: Generation capacity in Germany: the effect of wind 
Source: Brunekreeft & Twelemann (2004). 
 
Figure 4 shows capacities in Germany (Brunekreeft & Twelemann, 2004). The 
calculations combine numbers from different sources which are not perfectly comparable; the 
main message comes through clearly nonetheless. Following an initial reduction in capacity, 
installed capacity in Germany grows quite rapidly. It can be argued that the initial reduction 
of capacity reflects a decrease of excess capacity (e.g., mothballing). The recent increase is 
mainly wind generation. Wind is expected to grow from about 6 GW in 2000 to over 30 GW 
                                                
3 Capacity which is expected to run less than 2000 hours.  
4 Apart from steady growth of the interconnectors to Germany and Belgium, this reflects interconnectors to 
















































in 2008 on a peak load of about 76 GW and installed capacity of about 117 GW. Despite the 
growth, remaining capacity (as used in UCTE’s calculations) falls. The reason is that wind 
capacity is unreliable as there may be little or too much wind. Load factors are typically 
somewhat below 20%. This means that most of the capacity growth is non-usable capacity, 
which enters remaining capacity with a factor 0.2, reflecting the necessity to have back-up 
conventional assets. Hence, wind turbines may be good for the environment but do little for 
generation adequacy. 
Case studies of the UK and the Nordic countries give an indication of market response 
to scarcity signals. Generation capacity and subsequent reserve margins in the UK fluctuate 
quite strongly around its target value of 20%.5 This ratio is typically net of mothballed 
capacity. Projections include new planned capacity and decommission as far as they are 
declared to National Grid Transco (NGT). Taking the broad picture, we find that the reserve 
margin dropped from over 30% in 1990 to below 20% in 1996, rose steadily to 30% until 
2002 and dropped to 20% at the end of 2003. With some reservation, the first decrease may 
reflect strategic mothballing to increase wholesale prices. As pointed out by Roques et. al. 
(2004) the first increase was caused by the ‘dash for gas’; for a variety of reasons new CCGT 
entry was profitable and resulted in significant new capacity. It may be recalled that the dash 
for gas was in fact one of the driving forces behind the new electricity trading arrangements 
(NETA) which replaced the electricity pool in early 2001. At the introduction of NETA 
capacity was excessive and post-NETA wholesale prices have been (very) low, resulting in 
further mothballing and postponement of new projects. This explains the recent decrease of 
the capacity margin. Notably though, many of these planned projects still have permission. 
 Roques et. al. (2004, pp. 12 ff.) analyse what they call the first stress test for the UK 
system.6 Starting from the 20% reserve margin mid-2003 and following Powergen’s 
announcement to close some 1 GW capacity and mothball another 2 GW, NGT announced in 
May 2003 that reserve margin might fall as low as 16.2% in the winter 2003/04. Futures 
prices reacted swiftly raising baseload prices to £33/MWh and £55/MWh for baseload and 
peakload capacity, respectively. As a result, more than 1 GW mothballed capacity was 
brought back to the system, restoring the reserve margin. Actual wholesale prices were 
                                                
5 Note that in the UK, reserve margin is typically defined as the difference between installed capacity and peak 
load as a ratio of peak load, instead of as a ratio of installed capacity as by the OECD (cf. JESS, 2003, p. 29). 
6 One of the changes of NETA was to abolish the system of capacity payments which existed under the pool 
jointly to energy prices. NETA is an energy-only system. 
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£28/MWh (base) and £42/MWh (peak) in winter 2003/04.7 Thus it appears that the market 
handled the first stress test well. It should be noted though that the response is short term and 
relies on mothballed capacity. There is no indication in this case about new investment. The 
analysis does suggest though that ‘banking of permissions’ (i.e., increasing the life span of 
planning permits) may be an interesting option to enhance adequacy as it increases the speed 
of constructing new plant. 
 Capacity margins in the Nordic countries have grown thin. The capacity margin 
reached its lowest level in 2001 and, as noted by Von der Fehr et. al. (2004), investment has 
been very low. The authors point to tough environmental constraints as one explanation for 
low investment. New hydro in Norway is unlikely to get permission, while nuclear in Sweden 
and Finland is under pressure. Moreover, restrictions are placed on new plants, which emit 
greenhouse gases. Most notably though is the fact that the authors call the low investment 
(Von der Fehr et. al., 2004, p. 12) “one of the most important successes of regulatory reforms 
in the Nordic countries”. They first note that the reduction is simply a reduction of excess 
capacity, and secondly that the wholesale prices and the rate of return on capital in the ESI 
had been very low (5.5%). Since 2000, the rate of return has been increasing and has almost 
caught up with the average value of manufacturing industries. Despite political unease, 
Finland approved a new 1.6 GW nuclear power plant and over 1 GW of new gas plants are 
planned in Norway.  
 
2.2 Generation investment and policy uncertainty 
We treat two types of policy uncertainty affecting generation investment separately. On the 
one hand, policy which concern primary fuels, and on the other hand, policy to secure 
adequate generation capacity. For this paper, the latter is more relevant but at the same time 
less tangible. 
 
2.2.1 Primary fuels 
Increasing concern about gas and oil import dependence affects much of energy policy, at 
least in the EU, thus affecting policy uncertainty for the ESI. Commissioned by the European 
Commission, the Clingendael Institute (2004) analyses the geopolitical risk in the supply of 
                                                
7 Since the actual prices were lower than futures prices, which had predominantly been determined by 
mothballed and subsequently re-activated plant, one wonders whether traders have been fooled and whether (and 
how long) gaming by the producers is possible.    
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primary fuels. The report notes that gas imports will rise to 26% of total gas consumption in 
2030 for North America and 63% for Europe.8 One reason is the increasing share of gas as a 
primary fuel for electricity production. The concerns for supply security are that strategic 
dependence on the exporters (the Middle East, Caspian Sea area and Russia) is disturbing, and 
supply security is threatened by low (indigenous and foreign) investment in the exporting 
countries. 
Obviously, policy uncertainty is beyond the reach of (most) national governments. 
Yet, the identified problem and policy will affect lower level policies, including: 
diversification of primary fuels, which covers both fuel sources and importation from 
different regions; development of an integrated strategic reserves policy (sufficiently large 
reserves will flatten out short run interruptions); improving demand side management to 
reduce energy dependency,9 and developing indigenous energy sources (in particular, 
renewables like wind and hydro) to reduce dependencies. 
January 1st, 2005 was the start of the first round of the European emission trading 
system (ETS) of tradable CO2 emission rights. The first “warm-up” round runs until the end 
of 2007, after which the ETS starts formally running for 5 years (until 2012), thereby 
implementing the Kyoto protocol. Electricity producers need to have CO2 emission rights in 
accordance with production and associated emissions. Rights can be traded and will thus have 
a price. The effect is an implicit increase in the variable cost of producing electricity which is 
different for various fuels and technologies depending on their respective emission rates. 
Consequently, the price of CO2 rights determines the short term electricity price and 
production (the merit order) and. More importantly, both timing and technology choice of 
new investment is affected.10 The details for the period which just started have long been 
uncertain. Russia’s inclusion in Kyoto will greatly affect futures prices, and their participation 
has been very uncertain until recently. 
The amount of rights allocated to the ESI and the method of allocating rights to new 
plant (free or auctioned) is important for prices and investment. Helm et.al. (2003) argue that 
national governments will have difficulty to credibly commit to long-term targets as they will 
be tempted to renege ex-post. They argue for instance that the UK government did explicitly 
not commit to binding targets for 2020. As a remedy they favour an independent agency with 
a duty to reasonably fulfil the targets set by the government. An interesting illustration is the 
                                                
8 For oil, the figures are 50% and 70% respectively. 
9 Most notably, high costs of energy use will have the long term effect of slowing the growth in energy use. 
Consequently, energy taxes may have the beneficial side effect of increasing supply security. 
10 See Brunekreeft & Twelemann (2004) for calculations and details. 
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announced promise of the UK government to increase the number of CO2 rights beyond its 
national allocation plan in October 2004.11 The key uncertainty though is around the details of 
the new period (from 2008) and in fact the post-2012 period for which it is unclear what will 
happen. Clearly though, an investment in a large scale power plant built now will run after 
2012 as well. 
Overall, the CO2 ETS is a huge achievement and good environmental policy, but its 
uncertainty will affect investment. Applying the arguments of real option theory, one would 
expect two effects. First, a slow-down of investment to wait and see. Second, as the relative 
cost of various technologies is uncertain, one would expect a stronger diversification in 
different technologies, perhaps combined in one plant but most certainly within firms. 
 Renewables policy is an additional uncertainty. Renewables are part of environment 
policy and are affected directly by the CO2 ETS, but they can also enhance supply security of 
primary fuels since wind and hydro are indigenous. However, a variety of arguments indicate 
the limits of the promotion of renewables which would imply a change of the current 
favourable policy. As such, it seems reasonable to expect some hesitation to further invest. 
Lastly, uncertain policy on renewables and nuclear power increases the tendency to 
wait and see. Both the share of nuclear and the policy towards a nuclear phase-out differ 
strongly in various states, reflecting controversies. As mentioned above, Sweden, with a 50% 
share of nuclear has an uncertain policy on nuclear, while (with political unease) Finland 
recently approved a new nuclear power plant. In 1998, the German parliament decided to 
phase out nuclear capacity over the course of the next 20 years. The share of nuclear power in 
German electricity production is 32%. Industry observers expect that this policy will be 
reversed if the political opposition wins the general elections which are due to take place in 
2006. The immediate capacity effect may be moderate as the phase-out program is long and 
incorporates capacity which would likely be decommissioned anyhow. New investment plans 
are strongly affected though and are likely to be delayed. 
The overall conclusion concerning primary fuels is that policy uncertainty tends to 
delay investment as a wait-and-see effect. At the same time, this is a type of policy 
uncertainty which may be inevitable. 
 
                                                
11 As mentioned in the Financial Times of October 28, 2004. 
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2.2.2 Adequate generation capacity 
Stoft (2002, p. 111) points out two demand-side flaws which, at least for the foreseeable 
future, limit the market’s potential to provide sufficient reliability. First, a lack of real-time 
metering and billing results in little price responsive behaviour, and thus price as a scarcity 
signal or a rationing device does not work well. Even if consumers were more price 
responsive, there would be a free-rider problem, which is captured by the second flaw; the 
system operator’s inability to control the real time flow to specific customers. In other words, 
selective curtailment is not feasible. These two problems together imply that the market might 
not clear and, if demand is higher than supply, involuntary rationing will be unavoidable. 
Neuhoff & De Vries (2004) connect this to retail competition and argue that end-user 
switching impedes long-term contracting, resulting in inefficiently low capacity. Stoft (p. 147) 
calls the claim that the market will provide adequate reliability a fallacy, since “the system 
operator must set the price whenever supply fails to intersect demand.” Stoft (2002, p. 113) 
also explains that ISOs in the USA commit to operating reserves of about 10% of load, and 
pay ‘whatever is necessary’, and with prices “exceeding a few thousand dollars per megawatt-
hour, system operators understandably begin to have second thoughts.” As a consequence the 
ISOs have requested FERC’s approval for price caps. As mentioned above these have been set 
at $1,000/MWh. 
At the heart of the matter on adequacy is the rather controversial debate of whether the 
energy-only market will set sufficient incentives for investment in generation capacity, or 
whether policy should augment the investment incentives. The energy-only method is, in 
theory, a hands-off approach whereby the market players should essentially expect the 
regulator to ‘do nothing’. A prevailing view is that energy prices alone (or better yet, energy 
prices plus short term reserves) will not encourage investment sufficient to meet current 
reliability standards. The annualised costs of a peaking plant are in an order of magnitude of 
¼SHU0:$WDSULFHRI¼0:KWKHSODQWZRXOGUHTXLUHUXQQLQJKRXUVFI
similar but slightly higher values for the US in Stoft, 2002, p. 129). Bijvoet et. al. (2003) 
estimates the Value of Lost Load (VOLL) in the Netherlands on average at a rather high ¼
8.6/kWh (and even ¼N:KIRUKRXVHKROGV,IWKHVKXWGRZQSULFHLVVHWDW92//RI¼
8,000/MWh, the running time would only be 5 hours. These prices are very high. Using real 
data for New England Joskow (2003) shows that energy-only revenues are highly unlikely to 
recover costs of peaking plant.12 The robust analysis is somewhat tedious as New England has 
a price cap of $1,000/MWh on wholesale prices (installed after May 2000), which is 
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considerably below the ¼0:KPHQWioned above. Still, Joskow shows that the price cap 
was binding only 6 hours per year on average. He calculates the scarcity rents earned over this 
period at $10,000/MW-Yr, far less than the cost of reserve capacity which he estimates at 
approximately $70,000. Perhaps more importantly, as Joskow & Tirole (2004, proposition 5) 
argue these peak prices are very sensitive to the TSO’s actions and incentives.13 
The Brattle Group (2004, p. 10) concludes: “… we see unique institutional factors that 
contribute to a fundamental mistrust of markets. For example, the California power crisis has 
put pressure on most regulators in the United States to intervene directly with security of 
supply” and “In contrast, the British energy regulator (Ofgem) believes that markets will 
provide security of supply naturally” and “We believe that Ofgem has been reasonable, and 
that the distrust of spot markets in the United States may be exaggerated.” 
This distrust of spot markets takes account of the inevitable political unease with 
highly cyclical energy prices and the resulting inability of regulators to not intervene during a 
time of high prices. As an example, consider the case of San Diego just before the California 
crisis of 2001. Under AB 1890, which laid the foundation for the reformed California market 
in 1996, retail rates were frozen for six years in order that load serving entities (LSEs) could 
recoup stranded costs. Companies recovering costs before the 2002 deadline were free to raise 
rates. San Diego met this criterion in 1999 and doubled retail rates over the period that 
wholesale prices soared in late 2000. Bushnell & Mansur (2004) discuss this episode and the 
politicians response; specifically, the passing of Assembly Bill 265 which “froze rates for 
small and medium-sized (those under 100 kW) retail customers of SDG&E at 6.5 cents/kWh 
retroactive to June 1, 2000.” Ironically, the initial rate freeze was to satisfy producers since 
the worry was that retail prices would fall in a more competitive environment leaving them 
unable to recoup existing investment costs. As the San Diego example illustrates, political 
reality is that regulatory discretion is a huge uncertainty under this alternative. Part of the 
problem here is poor incentives for demand side participation which is exacerbated by price 
caps. Energy-only markets provide more volatile prices than other options discussed below 
(hence their political unpopularity), but without being exposed to the volatility, demand will 
continue to face few incentives to cut back at times of scarce supply. 
The rate freeze in California following deregulation in 1996 is an unusual example (for 
the utility industry) of a price ceiling that was essentially designed as a revenue floor to 
ensure that generators recovered stranded costs incurred before deregulation. Following the 
                                                                                                                                                   
12 With annualised costs of $60,000 - $80,000/MWy.  
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crisis in 2000 the revenue floor became a binding cap illustrating another aspect of 
uncertainty, namely, the ‘stickiness’ of policy. Once enacted there can be a significant lag 
before regulation is revised. 
 
We suggest that policy expectations can be self-fulfilling. Assume that the political reality 
dictates that the government interferes at some point, and assume further that government 
cannot commit to refrain from such interference. A strong argument for these assumptions is 
provided by the OECD, as noted by Roques et. al. (2004, p. 40). Capping high wholesale 
prices is likely to occur due to the inability to distinguish between the exercise of market 
power and real scarcity prices. A rational investor has to anticipate and internalise this 
possibility. If the anticipated interference manifests as an asymmetrical upward cap, expected 
returns would decrease ceteris paribus as compared to a situation where the government could 
credibly commit to doing nothing. The result is a decline in new investment which leads to 
scarcity, price spikes and an increased probability of involuntary rationing. This in turn 
increases the likelihood of an interference. A rational government also has these beliefs. 
Knowing that it cannot commit to doing nothing, and anticipating rational behaviour by the 
investors, the government’s anticipation of scarcity and the necessity to do something would 
be self fulfilling. The reverse argument also seems to hold. If both the government and the 
investors believe that there will be sufficient capacity, the probability of an intervention will 
be low (or absent), and investors will be willing to invest (more than they would anticipating 
an interference), and there will be sufficient capacity. It appears that multiple equilibria can 
exist: low capacity equilibria with interference and high capacity equilibria without 
interference. 
This type of argument is not unfamiliar in the theoretical literature. For instance Cabral 
(2000, ch.17) describes the existence of multiple fulfilled-expectations equilibria in the 
context of network effects. The underlying problem is that an individual’s decision to adopt a 
technology with network externalities depends on the expectation whether others will adopt 
the technology and so on. Armstrong, Cowan & Vickers (1994, p. 188) point out the 
regulatory problem of circularity, if a regulator determines the regulatory asset base (RAB) 
relying on the firm’s stock exchange value. If the market expects this to be high, the firm’s 
market value will be high and thus RAB will be high and thus allowed revenues will be high 
and expectation self-fulfil. 
                                                                                                                                                   
13 The resulting uncertainty strengthens the case for using the hedges of Financial Transmission Rights (cf. 
Brunekreeft, Neuhoff & Newbery, 2004, p. 8). 
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It can thus be plausible that the high capacity equilibrium will not be reached. This 
would imply that if the government cannot credibly commit to doing nothing it is the (second) 
best option to actually do something. The current situation both in the USA and lately in 
Europe seems to be just this ‘better safe than sorry’ policy. This in line with Oren’s (2004, p. 
24) discussion of rationales for capacity mechanisms: “Legitimate concerns for failure of the 
energy markets to reflect scarcity rents or failure of the capital market to produce proper 
levels of investment in response to such rents may justify some intervention. In some cases 
regulatory intervention in adequacy assurance is needed to compensate for regulatory 
interference in the energy market.” 
 
2.3 Generation adequacy and the search for good policy 
Determining an optimal level of capacity (including capacity reserves) must take account of 
factors such as outside options (e.g., imports), the cost of peaking capacity, and the value of 
lost load – which will vary internationally and regionally depending on the social cost of 
outages. This value might be higher than average in Silicon Valley, Brussels or London, for 
example. The optimal level of capacity trades off a reduction in lost load (greater capacity) 
and an increase in the cost of meeting load (smaller capacity) (Stoft, 2002, p.137). 
There are two diverse opinions about the market’s potential to set incentives for 
optimal investment. These centre on whether or not plant that is only run for a few hours each 
year will be able to recover fixed cost. The energy-only view suggests that, if prices are 
allowed to rise to their true scarcity levels, then yes, peaking plant will be able to recover 
capital costs and peaking capacity will therefore be provided by the market. Energy prices 
alone are sufficient to induce adequate generation investment according to this view. Texas is 
an energy-only market with bilateral contracting between LSEs and producers. LSEs must 
also contract for ancillary services. Relative to California, Texas has surplus generating 
capacity (adding 4.3GW of new capacity in 2003) and has added over 850 miles of new 
transmission lines since 1999. As discussed earlier, England and Wales is now an energy-only 
market. 
The energy-only view can be expanded to include VOLL pricing since efficient 
bargaining dictates that trading should only occur when willingness to pay exceeds the cost of 
production. During periods of scarcity the SO essentially purchases power on behalf of 
consumers; capping the purchase price at VOLL would ensure that he never paid more than 
consumers’ maximum reservation value. This is economically attractive and theoretically 
produces optimal investment, but is a high risk means of securing investment since high but 
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intermittent price spikes will yield erratic profit cycles for producers (Stoft, 2002) and 
possibly invite regulatory intervention. 
 
One reason for unease with the energy-only model is that generation security is often 
described as a public good with the conclusion that, as with other positive externalities, 
security will be under-supplied by the market. Joskow and Tirole (2004) use the case of a 
system collapse, resulting from the outage of a given generator or transmission line, to 
illustrate that operating reserves can be a public good. This view is embodied in Stoft’s 
second demand-side flaw discussed earlier. Since the SO cannot enforce bilateral contracts 
between producers and load that rely on the transmission network, individual customers 
cannot be shut down (or left on line) when there is load shedding. Thus, the consumer cannot 
pay for the property right to a given level of reliability.  
An alternative to an energy-only market is to institute a capacity market. Capacity 
markets can use either price or quantity methods to set incentives for investment. Price 
incentives take the form of capacity payments such as accompanied the former power pool in 
England and Wales. With capacity payments, generators declared available during a dispatch 
time period receive a payment (even if they are not dispatched). Argentina, Columbia and 
Spain use capacity payments. Even though capacity margins remained high throughout the 
life of the Pool, the capacity payment was widely criticized for being open to manipulation.  
This method is transparent, however, and uncertainties surrounding market power can be 
minimized if there are outside options to deal with anti-competitive behaviour. That was the 
case in England and Wales since the regulator could refer companies to the Monopolies and 
Merger Commission (now the Competition Commission). In the U.S., market monitoring 
units accompany newly established RTOs and these units can monitor and investigate 
potential manipulation of market rules. Serious allegations of abuse can be referred to the 
Department of Justice. Arguments against capacity payments include Joskow and Tirole’s 
(2004) illustration that capacity payments will not ensure that peaking capacity covers its cost 
if market power can affect multiple prices (e.g., peak prices and price close to peak), and 
Stoft’s (2002) discussion of risk and market power as two ‘side-effects’ of reliability policy. 
Many of the options for securing reliability, particularly those relying on VOLL pricing, have 
high but uncertain, infrequent price spikes. This is risky for investors, and high price spikes 
invite market power abuse. 
Quantity methods to procure reserve capacity are either centralized or decentralized, 
the former involving contracts between the system operator (SO) and producers and/or load, 
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and the latter involving contracts between producers and load.14 Centralized methods require 
determination of both a level of “reserve” capacity and a price to pay for reserves.15 Either or 
both of these components may be decided by the SO who may not have full information. One 
advantage of quantity alternatives relative to pricing alternatives is that the SO has some 
control over the magnitude and duration of price spikes. As discussed in Stoft (2002), the 
social/political acceptability of price spikes depends on their size and duration. A mechanism 
that produces low spikes more often has three benefits: (i) it is likely to be more acceptable, 
(ii) it would be less risky for investors, (iii) it would be less susceptible to market power. 
Two theoretically similar centralized methods of securing generation are strategic 
reserve pricing and operating reserve pricing. In each case the SO determines the amount of 
capacity to be held in reserve leaving the market to provide sufficient capacity for the energy 
market. A difference occurs if we interpret the market for strategic reserves as an ‘emergency’ 
market, possibly supplied using sources owned by the SO.16 An emergency market operates 
independently from the energy market, and could be subject to different, higher price caps 
than the energy market. According to Stoft (2002) the addition of an emergency market with 
its own price cap can control the exercise of market power by confining price spikes to this 
rather small portion of the market. For longer term adequacy this mechanism is less attractive 
than operating reserve pricing – one reason being that extensive use of an emergency market 
leaves much discretion to the SO in determining when to call on emergency reserves.  
Under reserve capacity pricing the SO has two instruments at his disposal: a maximum 
willingness to pay for reserves and the level of reserve capacity. The price the SO has to pay 
for reserve capacity is inversely related to the size of the reserve level. This holds for two 
reasons: (i) the more power contracted as reserve, the less there is available to be bid in the 
energy market and (ii) the SO can always reduce the reserve requirement (up to available 
capacity). The opportunity cost to a generator of contracting with the SO is the price he could 
obtain in the energy market. If the gap between demand and available capacity is large, the 
opportunity cost is small, so the SO can maintain a large reserve without paying much for it. 
As the gap between demand and available supply gets smaller, the SO can release reserve 
capacity into the energy market (i.e., reduce the size of the reserve) whilst maintaining the 
price he is willing to pay. At some point, however, as the capacity gap closes, the opportunity 
cost for generators rises above the SO’s willingness to pay, and the SO can only attract more 
                                                
14 Our explanation of quantity alternatives follows closely to Stoft (2002) and de Vries (2004). 
15 Here we use ‘reserve’ to refer to any capacity that is taken out of the energy market and set aside for another 
purpose such as meeting security requirements. 
16 Conditional on these resources only being deployed as a last resort when shortages occur. (de Vries, 2004). 
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reserves by paying more for them. The price in periods when reserves are dispatched would 
optimally be set at the cost of the marginal generator who is not included as part of the 
reserve. The SO can make this price higher (lower) by decreasing (increasing) the reserve 
level. A lower reserve level increases the duration of price spikes necessary for new 
investments.  
The method of reserve pricing can be augmented in a number of ways. The SO can 
contract for capacity on a daily or longer term basis. Longer term contracting would 
strengthen the price signals to investors and lessen arbitrariness and discretion in setting the 
reserve capacity level. The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs has recently recommended 
that the SO, TenneT, make broader use of (auctioning) long term contracts to secure 
adequacy. The Brattle Group study of 2004 recommended focusing contracts on peaking plant 
since a large part of peaking capacity in the Netherlands is likely to retire over the next 5 
years; for the longer term reserve capacity, quick response spinning reserves normally 
provided by base load are not required and slow response capacity provided by peak plant is 
cheaper. Market friendly extensions of reserve capacity pricing discussed by Vázquez et. al 
(2002) and Oren (2004) would allow the use of (call) options to procure reserve capacity.  
The US capacity markets aimed at securing long-term adequacy are decentralized 
requiring individual ‘load serving entities’ (LSEs) to obtain resources to meet their 
obligations (usually through bilateral contracts with generators).17 The additional market for 
their capacity should induce generators to invest in capacity beyond that required to meet 
peak load, and because contractual obligations can be traded in secondary markets price 
discovery is improved. ICAP markets are used in the PJM, NY and New England markets. In 
PJM, for example, capacity obligations are set such that the system as a whole maintains a 
loss of load expectation of one day in ten years. Under this mechanism generally, LSEs pay a 
penalty if they have not contacted with generators for the required surplus power or met 
shortfalls through interruptible contracts with consumers. The penalty becomes the 
indifference price between contracting for surplus power or being short and so sets the price 
for capacity contracts when they are scarce (de Vries, 2004). If the length of the contract 
period is too short generators will renege on their contractual obligations during times when 
the spot price is above the penalty price. Requiring yearly contracts and annualizing the 
penalty surpasses this problem, however (Stoft, 2002). Vázquez et. al (2002) criticize capacity 
obligations because only the price is determined by competition while the quantity that 
                                                
17 ICAP requirements in the US are approximately 118% of peak load (Stoft 2002). 
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producers are allowed to sell is administered – a  problem if there is a large amount of non-
thermal generation on the system. 
In the search for good policy on generation adequacy we maintain that until 
technologies for demand side participation become cost effective and private property rights 
for reliability can be credibly honoured, caution over generation adequacy is apposite and use 
of market friendly capacity mechanisms can reduce investor risk while appeasing politicians 
by ensuring a consistent revenue stream for producers without extreme price spikes. 
Mechanisms which rely on quantity targets may be less prone to market power abuse and 
have the advantage of allowing for tradable contracts. Centralized mechanisms, such as 
reserve market pricing can achieve the same result as decentralized methods but at less risk to 
LSEs who are reluctant to sign long term bilateral contracts with producers when retail 
competition is active. 
Relative to energy-only markets capacity mechanisms reduce the level but increase the 
duration of price spikes giving generators a more consistent revenue stream and lowering 
investment risk. Moreover, in an energy-only market the price signal for new investment 
occurs as demand approaches available supply. With capacity targets this price signal occurs 
much sooner since the market becomes tight as demand plus target approaches available 
supply, so the investment signal arises in advance of capacity need. The size of the target will 
determine how soon scarcity is reached and thus the timing of the investment signal. 
Capping prices at VOLL might theoretically lead to the optimal amount of capacity 
being supplied to the market, but VOLL pricing can lead to extreme price spikes which invite 
market power abuses and create a risky investment environment. Taking political reality and 
potentially risk averse investors into consideration capacity mechanisms appear to be a better 
alternative. 
 
3 Network adequacy  
3.1 Some evidence on network adequacy 
Whereas there is justified concern on generation investment and adequacy, both the theory 
and the evidence on network adequacy are less clear. Figure 5 gives network capacity over 
peak demand for the USA and UCTE (which here includes the CENTREL countries). These 
data give an impression of the capacity of the grid, but in many instances networks are ageing 
and need substantial investment to be modernised. 
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Figure 5: Network capacity in the USA and UCTE 
Note: capacity over the system’s peak load. Indexed with 2000 as base year.  
Sources: Hirst (2004) and UCTE statistics (various years) 
 
The data have been indexed (with 2000 as the base year) to enhance comparability. For the 
comparable years the developments appear similar, in both cases suggesting a modest decline 
of capacity. More striking is the big downward trend in the USA. However, it is not a priori 
clear what this trend tells us. Hirst (2004) notes that this has been a trend since the early 
1980’s and thus it is unlikely to be the (sole) effect of liberalisation. First, an existing grid can 
be optimised in use and design, facilitating higher network load. Second, planned grid 
expansions are often delayed by environmental permission obstacles. Third, since the 1980’s 
power plants have become smaller. CCGT, wind and other renewables are relatively small; 
distributed generation is small, close to the users, and mostly embedded in the distribution 
network. The smaller size of power plants means that the grid will take a different shape. One 
should expect that with decentralisation of power generation, the capacity of the high voltage 
grid can be reduced ceteris paribus. Fourth, generation and transmission capacity can be 
traded off to some extent. If a line connecting A and B is congested, then the line’s capacity 
might be increased to facilitate the power flow, or new generation capacity can be build on the 
importing side to reduce the power flow. Fifth, the data given above do not (accurately) 
reflect the spatial and temporal diversification of the grid and the subsequent load. Finally, 
grid capacity did grow in the last two decades, but peak load grew faster. 
Other arguments for a slow down in grid growth are directly or indirectly related to 
liberalisation and regulation. There are reasons to believe that for a long time reduced 
capacity margins reflected a reduction in excess capacity. It is persistently claimed that gold 
plating may have resulted in excess capacity with inefficiently high reliability. Also, demand 
growth up to the late 1970s and early 1980s had been large but fell steeply after that. The 








































for generation reserve margins, but one would expect the same to be true for network 
capacity. Related to this is the argument that regulators disallowed full pass through of capital 
cost of excess capacity, applying the used-and-useful clause. Lyon & Mayo (2000) suggest 
that this may have frustrated new investment to some extent. 
Furthermore, in both the USA and Europe, trading over networks has increased 
substantially. UCTE data suggest that cross-border exchanges in the UCTE area18 increased 
from about 200TWh in 1999 to 300TWh in 2003. The European Commission (CEC, 2002) 
outlines the current congestion on European interconnectors. Of 48 two-way cross-border 
interconnectors, 12 are frequently or always congested and 21 occasionally or seldom. Bialek 
(2004) argues that increased trade and reliance on the existing networks causes many of the 
current reliability problems. The interconnectors have simply not been built for extensive 
trade and time is needed to resolve the scarcity. Also, it is not always cost effective to reduce 
capacity by expanding interconnector capacity as it might be better to build new power plants. 
There is also concern that the price-cap regulation impedes new investment. The 
arguments are threefold: the first argument is more of an accounting argument than a genuine 
problem. If depreciation is such that the regulated asset base (RAB) plus depreciation 
decreases in time (eg. linearly), a significant new investment will require higher charges and 
hence a revision of the price cap. This reflects a common problem under price capping which 
at least delays significant new investment. The second concern is that price-cap regulation 
worsens the ability of regulators to commit to pre-announced policies. This issue will be dealt 
with in more detail further below. Third, there is justified concern that price-cap regulation 
impedes quality of supply (QoS). As QoS is a good indicator of network adequacy (and 
reliability) this is clearly an important point. 
Regarding quality, the arguments are relatively straightforward for the short run. 
Assuming that in the short run, demand is relatively inelastic to quality changes, then 
decreasing maintenance lowers costs will not (or only hardly) reduce quantity and vice versa. 
The assessment is unclear for the long run. Demand will adjust to reflect lower willingness to 
pay due to lower quality. This in turn translates into lower revenues which may offset the cost 
savings from reduced spending on maintenance. Moreover, in the long run, the price cap will 
be adjusted to reflect the reduced costs as well (a similarity to rate of return regulation). As 
long as price is fixed, quality will be lower than optimal, but this does not always hold for 
flexible prices (Spence, 1975). Because the classical form of rate-of-return regulation induces 
                                                
18 Including new members and including exchange with third countries. 
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excessive quality, one might expect quality to go down in many cases as a result of 
implementing price-cap regulation. 
 
 
Figure 6: Duration of supply interruptions in the UK 
Source: CPB (2004, p. 77). 
 
It is common to distinguish the following quality indicators: frequency of 
interruptions, duration of interruptions and energy not supplied (ENS). CPB (2004) studied 
the UK and Norway. Figure 6 shows the development for the price-capped electricity 
networks in the UK since liberalisation expressed in duration of supply interruptions. There is 
no clear pattern in unplanned outages but planned outages have gone down. The first is good 
news and suggests that the quality degradation under price caps may be moderate. The 
reduction in planned outages may be caused by reduced maintenance, and thus the associated 
short-run gain in quality may be bought at the expense of future lower quality. This 
explanation is convincing but one expects to see it manifest in higher unplanned outages at 
some point. Perhaps it is too early to see this effect, perhaps also the reduction in planned 
outages is the result of better managed maintenance. The data from Norway add an interesting 
feature. Under the price-cap regulation ENS improved. This could be because ENS is lost 
revenues19 and thus the firms will have an incentive at least not to lose too much power but it 
might also be the effect of lowering planned outage. CPB (2004, p. 75) suggests that the latter 
effect is more important. 
 
                                                




















Figure 7: Investment in Germany (aggregate) and Netherlands (TenneT only). 
Sources: For Germany, Brunekreeft & Twelemann (2004); TenneT’s annual reports 
 
A last indication of the network adequacy is the investment activity. Under the EU-TEN 
programme, 23,000 MW of additional transmission capacity inside or to the EU is planned. 
Figure 7 gives investment data for the electricity sector in Germany and for the TSO in the 
Netherlands (TenneT). The trend in Germany is blurred by the re-unification in 1990 which 
triggered large-scale modernisation of the former eastern ESI. It is re-assuring to see that the 
‘downward’ trend seems to have stabilised. The picture in the UK looks the same (cf. JESS, 
2003, p. 37). In the Netherlands, TenneT’s investment looks rather optimistic and probably it 
is. TenneT has announced and started major projects (basically strengthening the high voltage 
grid in the urban west and upgrading the interconnectors), but at the same time it should be 
noted that 2003 is the beginning of the new regulatory period and hence the natural period to 
book significant new investment; the RAB has increased accordingly. Moreover, TenneT is 
buying up regional high-voltage networks, which increases RAB without actual investment. 
In the Nordic countries investment is low, but according to Von der Fehr, et. al (2004, p. 17), 
there is no lack of initiative, but “it would seem that regulatory and political will, rather than 
commercial will, is going to be decisive.” 
 
3.2 Regulation and the cost of capital. 
Regulation has an effect on the incidence of market risk on the regulated firm. The reference 
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conventional measures of owner risk. By buffering the firm against demand and cost changes, 
the variability of profits (and stock prices) should be lower than otherwise. To the extent that 
the cost and demand changes are economy-wide, regulation should reduce systematic as well 
as diversifiable risk.”20 The crucial factor is how much of the shocks can be passed through to 
customers. Profit-maximising prices of a firm with market power pass through only part of the 
demand and cost shocks and absorb the other part to restore optimality and thereby profits 
vary with demand and cost shocks. In contrast, under an admittedly extreme notion of rate-of-
return regulation (i.e. with a regulatory gap of zero), the firm in fact passes through all of the 
shocks in order to stick to the allowed rate of return. Hence, variability in profits is low. The 
investment in the rate-of-return regulated firm may give low returns but at least they are safe. 
The perspective changes for firms regulated with a price cap. Wright et. al. (2003) 
examine the case of price caps in detail. They conclude that the cost of capital are higher 
under price-cap regulation than for an unregulated firm for cost uncertainty.21 This is intuitive 
because if costs change and prices stay as they are, variability in revenues and profits is 
strong. For demand uncertainty, cost of capital are lower under price-cap regulation than 
without regulation. For demand uncertainty, the price cap works as the buffer under rate-of-
return regulation. The fact that the firm is not allowed to increase the price (to adjust to 
demand increase) and, with a binding cap, does not wish to decrease the price (to adjust to a 
demand decrease) means that the changes in profits are less under the price cap than they 
would be if the firm would freely adjust to demand changes. 
In practice rate-of-return and price-cap regulation are not that different. As has been 
explained by Joskow (1989), the US procedure in rate hearings is triggered by either the firm 
or the regulatory commission. This implies that as long as prices fall within reasonable range, 
nothing will happen and the endogenous regulatory lag can in fact be quite long.22 Grout & 
Zalewska (2003) present an interesting study on the effect of different regulatory regimes on 
risk as measured by CAPM. They study the effect of profit-sharing regimes in the UK during 
the second half of the 1990s. Profit sharing should here be seen as an explicit modification of 
price-cap regulation in order to re-allocate high profits made by the firms under the price-cap 
regulation. Grout & Zalewska (2003) define profit sharing as a weighted average of the 
outcome under rate-of-return regulation and the outcome under price-cap regulation. The 
                                                
20 Brennan & Schwartz (1982) confirm the claim with a formal and numerical approach. 
21 Except for the case of complete cost-pass-through. 
22 In fact this may well be asymmetric; nothing changes downward, while upward regulated prices can be 
adjusted. 
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weight is the profit-sharing factor. The econometric analysis confirms that profit sharing 
lowers the risk and thus the cost of capital. 
The results suggest that as underinvestment becomes a more serious threat, rate-of-
return regulation will become more attractive ceteris paribus. In less formal terms, what one 
would expect to observe is an increasing tendency to shorten and/or endogenize the regulatory 
lag. Modifying the price-cap rules with an explicit profit-sharing rule may be an interesting 
hybrid.23 The task is to design a profit-sharing rule which reduces risk while at the same time 
retains the virtues of a price-cap rule.24 
 
3.3 Asymmetry and dynamic consistency 
The problem addressed in this subsection concerns the inability of regulators to credibly 
commit to an implicitly or explicitly agreed rate of return. The policy uncertainty here is 
uncertainty around the regulator’s behaviour. The effect is asymmetrical capping of revenues 
and a consequent decrease in expected returns. The cost of capital might be unaffected or at 
least play only a minor role. 
 Underlying the discussion is how to achieve consistency of the regulated rate of 
return. A seminal contribution stems from Myers (1972, p. 79), who studies the ‘fair’ rate of 
return in regulation. Myers argues in favour of a competitive benchmark, implying the use of 
a ‘conscious’ regulatory lag, thereby effectively arguing for a price-cap regulation avant la 
lettre. Myers’ emphasis is on making the concept of a fair rate of return operational and on 
short-run efficiency effects.25 Myers also notes the consequence that the risk for the firm 
might be higher than under the no-lag rate-of-return regulation and the fact that ex-ante price 
capping might allow (excessively) high profits. 
 The electric power industry in the USA provides a critical illustration of regulatory 
uncertainty, which may or may not be opportunism. The power industry in the USA has long 
been regulated by rate-of-return regulation. However, as explained well by Joskow (1989), 
rate-of-return regulation in practice meant setting allowed price (derived from allowed profit 
rate) until a rate hearing would revise these. These rather costly and time-consuming rate 
hearing could either be called by the regulator or the firm. This principle establishes an 
                                                
23 Note however that here the profit-sharing rule would not to share ‘excessive’ profits, but rather to reduce risk 
and thereby not impede investment. 
24 An example might be the incentive scheme for the balancing services for the system operator NGT in the UK. 
The scheme works with sharing factors (up- and downside) and caps and collars around target levels. 
25 Note that the traditional rate of regulation in the USA did have a regulatory lag but that this has not been 
consciously but rather ad hoc (cf. Joskow, 1974 and 1989). 
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endogenous regulatory gap and causes prices to be sticky (especially upward). In the 1970s, 
fuel prices rose and demand growth stagnated, which in turn triggered rate hearings. Joskow 
(1989) argues that the increasing energy prices put the regulators under pressure to disallow 
the price rises. In effect, the used-and-useful clause was applied ex post to especially nuclear 
power plants. The used-and-useful clause implies that costs can only be passed through if the 
economic value is higher than accounting costs. Lyon & Mayo (2000) estimate that some US$ 
19 billion was not allowed. They also note that the bulk of these disallowances was for 
management imprudence, but major disallowances concerned excess capacity. To our view, 
the distinction is crucially important. The former is exactly what one would expect a regulator 
to do and corresponds to regulatory consistency. The latter was opportunistic behaviour and 
breach of the regulatory compact. Joskow (1989, p. 161) notes critically that: “utilities learned 
that if they built large new generating plants, they might very well not recover their 
investment: commissions might resist large rate increases even if the increases were fully 
justified.” 
 Lyon & Mayo (2000) make an empirical assessment of the disallowances of excess 
nuclear assets. They find that the propensity to invest for firms being subjected to a 
disallowance did decline and moderately for nuclear investment by other utilities in the same 
state. This characterises the non-commitment problem: if the regulator cannot credibly 
commit to its announced policy, it will frustrate investment.26 Stated with some reservation, 
the analysis in Lyon & Mayo (2000) suggests that a used-and-useful rule applied against bad 
management does not spill-over and is regulatory consistent; at the same time, if it is a breach 
of regulatory contract it increases uncertainty (asymmetrically) and adversely affects 
investment. Whether an application of the used-and-useful clause is consistent or 
opportunistic is ultimately for the investors to decide.  
Gilbert & Newbery (1994) offer an interesting perspective to the used-and-useful rule 
under rate-of-return regulation (UUROR). In essence, the used-and-useful clause may strike a 
good balance between a pure rate-of-return and a price-cap regulation. Under pure rate-of-
return regulation the regulator has been constrained constitutionally to allow a fair rate of 
return. This may be safe to the firm but it is well known that it induces overinvestment. Price-
cap regulation can be seen as a regulatory system in which the regulator is not 
                                                
26 They also find that the reputational spill-over effects on non-nuclear investment is small or even reverse, 
which is counterintuitive. The argument may be that the spill-over effect (which reduces investment) is 
compensated by better investment opportunities in non-nuclear assets. Lyon & Mayo (2000, p. 8) also conclude 
that the isolated nature of the reputational spill-over may hold for transmission and distribution facilities. 
However, as the isolation effect claims that it does not spill-over from one utility to the next, it remains unclear 
whether the spill-over is isolated form one department to the other in the same utility.  
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(constitutionally) constrained to allow a fair rate of return. In this case, regulators may be 
tempted to deviate from previously announced policies and will have difficulty to commit to 
not doing so. Anticipating this, firms will tend to underinvest. By allowing to shave off 
extreme and unreasonable outcomes, a UUROR decreases the regulator’s incentives to cheat 
and thereby increases the regulator’s credibility. In more formal terms, in a repeated game, the 
UUROR enhances the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria along the optimal investment 
path. At the same time, proper application of the UU clause mitigates the goldplating 
incentives under the pure ROR regulation. 
The asymmetry policy uncertainty, which has been addressed above, played a role in a 
recent Australian debate (cf. e.g. Gans & King, 2003), in particular, with respect to new risky 
interconnectors. The discussion appears to have found its way in the EU Regulation on Cross-
Border Exchange of July 2004. In Australia this was one of the arguments to allow 
unregulated merchant investor for interconnectors.27 A handful of such projects have been 
completed with mixed  success. The European approach is laid down in the EU Regulation on 
Cross-border Exchanges which entered into force July 1st, 2004.28 Art. 7 of the regulation 
allows for new interconnectors to be exempted from art. 6(6) of the regulation and arts. 20 and 
23 of the EC electricity directive.29 The former specifies regulation of the revenues of 
allocation of scarce interconnector capacity, while the latter requires (regulated) third party 
access to the network. One of the conditions to qualify is that the project is risky (cf. 
Brunekreeft, 2004). In Europe no Art. 7 projects are known at the moment of writing. In the 
USA, some merchant projects into the New York area have been proposed, but the investors 
have difficulty to find funds. 
 
3.4 Good governance 
The policy discussion can be captured by the term good (market) governance. Hancher, 
Larouche and Lavrijssen (2003, p. 356) define good governance as: “the search for the best 
set of all laws, regulations, processes and practices that affect the functioning of a regulatory 
framework and the market”. Amidst a long list of aspects (cf. Hancher, et. al., 2003), we think 
that two aspects stand out for the regulation of the complex network industries: independence 
and flexible powers. 
                                                
27 To be precise, for underinvestment, the expected rate of return should be below required cost of capital. This is 
the case if the benchmark is regulation with a fair rate of return, but (need) not if the benchmark is no regulation.  
28 Regulation 26 June 2003 (1228/2003) (1/7/04). 
29 EC Electricity Directive 2003/54/EC, 26 June 2003. 
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 Independence has been well formulated by Ocana (2003, p. 17) as meaning “that the 
regulatory agency is protected from short-term political interference.” Indeed, a regulator with 
the authority to create and divide rents will be subject to capture by politics. The politician is 
likely to have different aims than the regulator. Politicians, subject to re-elections, will tend to 
have a higher ‘political discount factor’, and will therefore have a stronger tendency to ‘make 
hay while the sun shines’.30 The effect of political interference can go two ways depending on 
ownership. If the state is owner of the regulated industry it will have an interest in high prices 
and subsequent profits. On the other hand if the regulated industry is fully private, the state 
may follow consumer interests and pursue low prices. In that case, the industry runs into the 
hold-up problem as outlined above. Spiller (1996 quoted in Ocana, 2003, p. 17) points out that 
statutory independence of a regulator can be seen as a commitment against opportunistic 
behaviour. Changing legislation is costly and time-consuming and usually requires 
parliamental approval. 
 Independence of regulators requires careful restriction of regulators’ authority. This in 
turn raises a problem. Too much detail is likely to become unworkable for complex and 
dynamic sectors like network industries. It seems an impossible task to design a complete 
regulatory contract, without having to modify it frequently. Not only will legal adjustment be 
slow and costly, but it is also likely to open up opportunities for strategic behaviour by the 
regulated firms. Moreover, if the law contains too much detail the regulator will be vulnerable 
to legal challenge. On the other hand, if the law is too broad (degree of detail too low) it is 
likely to be incomplete. This implies that either the regulation may take an unintended shape 
or the regulator should be given the authority to interpret the law: i.e. the regulator should 
have flexible powers. Hence, independence requires flexible powers. 
 The story of the regulated (electricity) charges in the Netherlands illustrates well.31 
The regulator for energy markets in the Netherlands is DTe which is a chamber of the 
competition agency NMa, which is a supervisory body of the Ministry of Economics. DTe 
decided correctly to apply individual Xi’s to firms for the first regulation period (2001 - 
2003), after which it could reasonably be expected that firms would have caught up and the 
non-individual X yardstick could then be applied in the second regulation period. The Xi’s 
determined by DTe in the first round were high. The sector did not accept them and appealed. 
Importantly, appeals against the DTe decisions are the responsibility of the Court of Appeal 
for Trade and Industry (CBB), which makes judicial reviews rather than a testing for 
                                                
30 The terms are derived in analogy to the management-shareholder relation as set out in Vickers & Yarrow 
(1988, p. 21) who use the term ‘managerial discount factor’. 
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substance. It decided that the law did not allow individual X-factors and the regulation had to 
be revised (retrospectively). This illustrates the flaw of the system very well. On the one hand, 
one would like to give DTe flexible powers to interpret the law, but on the other hand one 
would like to constrain DTe’s authority. Since there is no substance review, the judicial 
review by the Appeal Court restricted DTe’s power to interpret the law, at the expense of 
good substance.32 
  
Two approaches mitigate the apparent incompatibility of independence and flexible powers. 
First, a system of checks and balances. Second, changing the incentives of the regulator. A 
system of checks and balances has been developed in, for example, the UK (cf. Green, 1999 
and Geroski, 2004),33 between especially the regulators and the competition commission 
(CC). This sounds easier than it actually is. Green (1999) points out that regulators have to 
follow CC’s recommendations following a referral. The inevitable result is that the regulators 
start to anticipate and mimic the CC’s procedures, implying that the system of checks and 
balances is undermined. A strong system of checks and balances requires different institutions 
having different mandates and possibly accentuating different interests (cf. for a similar 
argument, Laffont & Martimort, 1999). This, however, runs into the problem of who decides 
in case of disagreement. The following strikes a balance. First, regulators should have a clear 
mandate, phrased preferably in terms of meaningful and possibly well-defined objectives. A 
court can (should) then test whether the regulator acts according to the objectives set by the 
legislator. Second, a system of checks and balances of different institutions, controlling each 
other with non-binding recommendations, would guarantee a check on substance. 
The relation in the UK between the CC and the sector regulators illustrates well. 
Geroksi (2004) explains the two-tier approach with the sector regulators in the first tier and 
the CC in the second tier. According to Geroski (2004, p. 78, italics added), the CC is: “an 
investigative body with the expertise to decide on issues of substance.”  Interestingly, the CC 
has determinative powers for most regulators, but in the case of the regulation airport landing 
charges it can only make non-binding recommendations. Where CC decisions are 
determinative, firms can appeal for judicial review by the Competition Appeal Tribunal. 
 Alternatively, the incentives of the regulator may be recognised and if necessary 
changed. In a way, the approach of increasing independence is an ‘incentive mechanism’; the 
                                                                                                                                                   
31 The interested reader may be referred to Hancher, et. al. (2003) and Nillesen & Pollitt (2004) for more detail. 
32 The ruling had several consequences. First, the law was modified retrospectively to allow individual X-factors. 
Second, the X-factors had to be adjusted again. Finally in May 2003, the final X factors were agreed with the 
sector; this was only months before the end of the regulatory period. 
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idea is to reduce the incentives to behave opportunistically (or myopically) by lengthening the 
‘regulatory discount factor’. Further, the analysis of UUROR by Gilbert & Newbery (1994) as 
set out above, can be seen as an incentives change. They explain that allowing the clause that 
assets should be ‘used and useful’ reduces the incentives of the regulator to deviate from the 
(optimal) regulatory contract after the investment. Lastly, suppose that complete regulatory 
independence from political interference is an illusion and suppose further that it is correct 
that the state’s incentives to capture the regulator depend on ownership of the regulated 
industry. If the state is owner, the state will want to have high prices, while if the industry is 
privately owned the state will press for low prices. The logical conclusion must be that 
private-public ownership might strike a balance on the incentives of the state. This view adds 
another dimension to the privatisation debate. 
 
4 Concluding remarks 
This paper identifies and analyses key sources of policy uncertainty which impede investment 
incentives in the electric power industry. New investment critically determines long term 
system reliability, which is captured by the term supply adequacy, covering both generation 
and network adequacy. The benchmark in this paper is that symmetric, non-systematic, 
diversifiable risk without (future) spin-offs has no effect on investment. We have constrained 
attention to 1) asymmetric uncertainty, 2) non-diversifiable risk and 3) uncertainties creating a 
real option value. We use the term policy uncertainty in a broad sense to cover the effects of 
uncertain regulation where it already exists, the effects of market risks under different types of 
regulation and, importantly, the mere possibility of an intervention where no policy exists or 
where policy is vague.  
 The evidence on generation adequacy is inconclusive. The short-run outlook is 
optimistic as are stress-tests, but the long-run perspective (although not entirely reliable) gives 
reason for concern. Calculations suggest that hands-off, energy-only markets and resulting 
prices might simply not suffice to attract sufficient new investment in peaking plant. That 
prices would have to be implausibly high is supported by three observations. Firstly, it has not 
yet happened that prices have been high enough and for sufficient duration to cover estimated 
costs of peaking generation capacity. Second, as discussed by Joskow and Tirole (2004) high 
prices are extremely sensitive to the discretion of the TSOs. Third, extreme situations are 
likely to trigger intervention. Hence, the mere possibility of an intervention already 
                                                                                                                                                   
33 See Vol. 12 (2004) of Utilities Policy which is a special issue on the UK. 
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asymmetrically caps revenues. Following this line of argument, it seems that the policy 
expectations can be self-fulfilling leading to multiple potential equilibria: low capacity 
equilibria with interference and high capacity equilibria without interference. 
If the scenario of fulfilled policy expectations is plausible, the second-best option of 
actually doing something seems inevitable. Hence, a ‘better safe than sorry’ policy may 
simply be realistic. To this end, a myriad of capacity mechanisms have been proposed and 
debated in the literature. Part of this debate centres around the relative merits of price and 
quantity methods of incentivizing investment. As discussed by Stoft (2002) capacity 
payments produce higher, more erratic price spikes implying that quantity measures have less 
inherent risk and are less susceptible to market power abuses. As such one would also expect 
quantity measures to invite less regulatory interference. Capacity mechanisms should be 
flexible and ‘market-friendly’ including well-defined long term and secondary contract 
markets. Reserve pricing fits this description and can include hedging instruments that might 
be exercised centrally by the system operator or bilaterally between producers and load. A 
disadvantage relative to capacity ‘obligations’ is that the SO has discretion over both the 
quantity of reserves and the willingness to pay for reserves. With obligations only the quantity 
is determined by the SO. Future policy should address ways to lower regulatory discretion and 
minimize distortions from capacity markets on energy market prices. 
 The situation for network adequacy is rather different than for generation. With the 
exceptions of the interconnectors, network investment seems to be good empirically. 
Theoretical concern over underinvestment in networks may be empirically negligible or not 
yet observable. With respect to policy uncertainty there are two lines of argument. First, price 
cap regulation is likely to increase market risk compared to no regulation and especially rate 
of return regulation. Second, regulators may be unable to credibly commit to a consistent 
regulatory policy and to refrain from opportunistic behaviour. The ‘hold-up’ or ‘non-
commitment’ problem has received extensive attention in the literature. This is particularly 
relevant for significant new investment under price caps. Importantly, Gilbert & Newbery 
(1994) argue that the so-called used-and-useful rate-of-return regulation (UUROR) may be 
seen as a way to increase the regulator’s credibility and would therefore improve investment 
incentives. Overall, we would expect to see rate-of-return regulation regaining territory 
compared to price capping if underinvestment in the network gains importance and short-run 
efficiency gains are exhausted; of course, shifts are likely to find subtle channels like smaller 
regulatory lags and profit-sharing clauses. 
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Lastly, we discussed the institutional prospects to improve the credibility of the 
regulators in order to improve the investment climate. Given the key importance of 
independence from political interference and flexible powers, a system of checks and balances 
with an institution with jurisdiction on substance is recommendable. Although debatable, it 
may well be that such an agency should have recommendation powers only. 
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